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This paper examines the impact of trade and fiscal reforms and of the 1994 devaluation of the 
CFA franc on enterprise development in Chad and Gabon. These reforms provide a natural 
experiment to assess the impact of trade liberalisation in countries with a small and backward 
manufacturing sector. The empirical analysis is based on a new panel data b ase covering 
virtually the whole population of manufacturing firms in Chad and Gabon, and containing data 
spanning from the year before to two years after the reforms. The paper finds that although 
firms’ response to changing incentives was non-negligible, with a shift of output from non 
tradable to tradable and an increase in productivity, the reform process was unable to generate a 
virtuous and self-sustained circle, where export expansion brings a generalized productivity 
increase which in turn feeds on further export growth. 
   3 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In developing countries, exchange rate devaluation often takes place in conjunction with 
broad trade and fiscal reforms, the objective being to correct macroeconomic imbalances, 
improve competitiveness, reduce anti-export biases and strengthen fiscal systems. 
CFA countries provide a natural experiment in this regard. The devaluation of the CFA 
franc in January 1994 was followed by commercial and fiscal reforms in most countries. There 
has been considerable controversy in the literature as to the effects of such reforms 
(Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 1995, Devarajan 1996 for the CFA; Winters, 2000 for a more 
general assessment). We examine here their effects on the manufacturing sector in two small 
CFA economies, Gabon and Chad. Despite presenting radically different levels of per capita 
GNP ($6480 in Gabon and $978 in Chad in 1997), these countries have a number of common 
features which are typical of other small backward economies, as evidenced by the weakness of 
their manufacturing sector, its dependence on the initial transformation of natural resources and 
on imported inputs and the inward orientation of most of its firms. 
To assess the impact, of the devaluation and concomitant trade and fiscal reforms this 
paper relies on detailed firm-level data spanning the period 1993-1996 for a sample of industrial 
enterprises in Chad and Gabon. The main finding is that while  firms’ response to changing 
incentives was non-negligible, with a marked shift of output from non tradable to tradable and an 
increase in productivity, the reform process was unable to generate a virtuous and self-
sustained circle, where export expansion brings a generalized productivity increase which in turn 
feeds on further export growth. Indeed, we find no evidence of a positive direct link between 
export orientation and productivity growth. Productivity growth for exporters was merely due to 
scale effects rather than export orientation. Because they were exposed to a positive price shock 
exporters could grow more rapidly. As for non-exporting firms, input costs increased markedly,   4 
particularly for firms that rely mostly on imported inputs, output growth was often negative, with 
the fall in size being associated with a decline in productivity. On the basis of these evidences, 
there are grounds to suspect that the adjustment process may have aggravated the dualism 
between large exporters and relatively small firms that cater mainly to the domestic markets and 
are unable (or unwilling) to shift toward foreign markets. 
An additional finding is that there was virtually no entry of new firms in the export sector 
following devaluation and trade reforms. This result is consistent with an earlier study on exports 
on Cameroon (Tybout et al., 1997). 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the major shocks 
and the policy reforms implemented in both countries. In section 3, we use detailed survey data 
spanning the 1993-96 period, to quantify how the shocks affected relative costs. Section 4 
documents and interprets enterprise reaction to the new incentives in terms of resources 
reallocation, looking at changes in output, productivity and export performance. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS AND POLICY RESPONSES 
 
  During the  eighties and up to the early 1990s, economic performances in Chad and 
Gabon have been largely unsatisfactory. GDP has been virtually stagnant in Chad and highly 
vulnerable to the gyrations of oil prices in Gabon. Even after the exploitation of a new and very 
large oil field, Gabon’s growth stagnated at around 2% in the early 1990s. Production of major 
export crops such as cotton in Chad and timber in Gabon declined steadily and the resource 
balance was close to minus 20% of GDP for Chad and only mildly positive for Gabon. In the 
latter case, furthermore, government revenues were being eroded as oil exports fell and tax 
exemptions and evasion became more pervasive.   5 
  The policy environment changed radically in January 1994. Chad and Gabon, together 
with the other countries in French-speaking Africa, drastically devalued their common currency, 
the CFA Franc, by 100% against the French currency to which it was, and still is, pegged. 
  Furthermore, under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF, and as other UDEAC 
countries, Chad and Gabon also introduced a trade and indirect tax reform in order to harmonize 
the system within the region, with the objective of facilitating exchanges among member 
countries and making the industrial sector more competitive. 
In both countries, decrees were adopted in early 1994 to implement the trade and indirect 
tax reform. The reform was initially supposed to take effect beginning in January 1995
1 but was 
brought forward in order to limit the cost-push effects caused by the devaluation. The reform 
included three main components affecting external trade. First, a unified tariff system, the 
Common External Tariff (Tarif extérieur commun, TEC), applicable to imports from non-UDEAC 
countries, was introduced in place of the previous somewhat cumbersome tariff structure. 
Imports were classified into four categories, with tariffs ranging from 5% to 30% (compared with 
rates of between 0% and 260% under the previous system in Gabon and 5% to 90% in Chad). 
Second, a General preferential tariff (Tarif préférentiel généralisé, TPG) was introduced for trade 
among UDEAC countries. Finally, indirect taxes were also reformed with the elimination of all 
indirect tax privileges, and the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) (TCA in Chad). 
The 1994 devaluation and the accompanying reforms were quite successful in inducing a 
substantial depreciation of the real effective exchange rate. In fact, although domestic prices 
rose by roughly 30% in the aftermath of the reform, inflation cooled down in the following years, 
so that the real exchange rate in 1996 was a good 30% lower than in 1993. 
However, aggregate data are typically unable to capture the full constellation of price 
incentives facing individual firms. Moreover, even if relative prices do change, institutional and 
                                                                   
1  January 1, 1994 in Cameroon.   6 
structural weaknesses may severely constrain the capacity of individual firms to respond to the 
new set of incentives. For Gabon and Chad there are reasons to suspect that this may be 
indeed the case. In both countries, most manufacturing firms cater exclusively to the domestic 
markets. Only a handful of firms export a significant share of their output. Moreover, while export-
oriented firms are relatively large, they tend to export only a limited fraction of their total 
production. Under these circumstances, exchange rate devaluation may have only limited effects 
on the industrial sector unless it triggers either a significant response by existing exporters or a 
flow of new entries of firms catering to foreign markets. Moreover, the high commodity 
concentration and the early processing stage of export flows may work to hamper the overall 
price response. In the next section, therefore, we take a close look at the firm level response 
drawing on a special survey. 
 
3.  FIRM-LEVEL CHANGES IN RELATIVE PRICES 
 
Manufacturing firms in Chad and Gabon were surveyed
2 to collect information on the 
values and quantities of their five major inputs and five major outputs in the fiscal years 1992-93 
and 1995-96. Information was also collected on a set of firms’ characteristics, performance and 
constraints to growth for the period 1992-93 to 1995-96. The three-year period was chosen so 
as to encompass information preceding the devaluation and trade reforms and the most recent 
complete fiscal years following the reforms. 
3.1  Nature of the Sample 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
2  All types of manufacturing firms were targeted, foreign and domestically owned private and public 
ownership, large and micro size firms. To qualify for inclusion i n the sample, a firm had to be a 
manufacturing firm and have at least one full time employee in addition to the owner.   7 
Table 1 presents some basic characteristics of the sample including sectoral 
composition, average firm size and age. 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of the Sample 
(percentage of firms) 
  GABON  CHAD 
SECTOR     
Food    14.9%  (13)    29.8%  (17) 
Wood    29.9%  (26)    14.0%  (8) 
Textiles    2.3%  (2)    14.0%  (8) 
Metal    14.9%  (13)    24.6%  (14) 
Chemical    10.3%  (9)    7.0%  (4) 
Printing    12.6%  (11)    7.0%  (4) 
Other    14.9%  (13)    3.5%  (2) 
TOTAL    100.0%  (85)    100.0%  (57) 
     
SIZE (1996)     
Micro (2-4 employees)    9.4%  (8)    12.3%  (7) 
Small (5-29 employees)    47.1%  (40)    64.9%  (37) 
Medium (30-99 employees)    27.1%  (23)    12.3%  (7) 
Large (100+ employees)    16.5%  (14)    10.5%  (6) 
     
EMPLOYMENT (1996)     
Mean    103  (85)    109.4  (57) 
     
OWNERSHIP (1996)     
Private domestic    14.3%    71.4% 
Private foreign    67.9%    14.3% 
Public    17.8%    14.3% 
     
AGE (1996)     
Mean    13.8  (85)    14.2  (57) 
     
Note:Number of firms in parenthesis.   8 
A total of 85 firms were surveyed in Gabon and 57 in Chad. Firms were asked to provide 
information on their five main inputs and outputs, import intensity and export activities, as well as 
information on firm characteristics, production, costs, taxes and constraints to growth.
3 
As illustrated in Table 1, the wood sector was the most highly represented sector in our 
sample in Gabon (29.9% of the sample), while in Chad the food sector was heavily represented. 
The textile sector was practically absent from the Gabon sample. When firms are classified in 
terms of full time employment in 1996, we can see that small firms (5-29 employees) constitute 
the largest category in both countries (47.1% in Gabon and 64% in Chad). Medium-sized firms 
(30-99 employees) are more prevalent in Gabon (27.1% compared with 12.1% in Chad). Foreign 
ownership was significant in the sample in Gabon. 
 
3.2  Relative Price Shocks 
 
Among the 85 firms surveyed in Gabon, only a subset of 44 firms were able to supply 
complete and credible information on prices and quantities for their main inputs and outputs. In 
Chad, 34 of the 57 firms surveyed presented complete price data. From this point on, it is this 
sub-sample of firms that will be used in our analysis. 
Using this sub-sample, we constructed unit prices for each product and input
4. Firm-
specific Fischer indexes of the price of each firm’s output bundle were then constructed using 
these product and input specific prices, PQ , and intermediate goods bundle, PI , Taking growth 
                                                                   
3  Interviews in Gabon were carried in Libreville and its suburbs between May 19 and June 13 1997. 
Interviews in Chad were carried out in N’djamena and Moundou between June 9 and 12. The teams of 
interviewers included people from CETAI at HEC in Montreal and local consultants. 
4  Firms had the choice of providing either their direct output price or the value of their various outputs and 
the n umber of units produced In such a case, output price was constructed by dividing the value of 
production by the number of units produced. For example, indexing products by  j, we obtained 
jt jt jt Q / V P =  , j = 1, J. Intermediate input prices were imputed analogously. 
   9 
rates in these indexes between the fiscal years 1992-93 and 1995-96, firm by firm, we then 
obtained the cross-firm distributions of growth rates of relative input prices (PI / PQ ). This three-
year time period covers the devaluation and reforms that took place in 1994. Fiscal years 
1993/94 and 1994/95 have been left out to sharpen the contrast. 
 
TABLE 2 
Growth in relative input price 
(Cumulative percentages  1992-93 to 1995-96) 
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  We note in Table 2 that the combination of devaluation and commercial policy reforms 
increased the relative price of inputs for the average and the median firm in both countries. There 
is a wide range of variation across firms, but the typical increase is about 25% over the three-
year period in Gabon and 35% in Chad. Furthermore, more than three-quarters of all firms in 
both countries experienced at least some increase. 
  In order to trace differences in incentives among firms with difference in degree of 
exposure to the foreign markets, the sample is broken down according both to the export   10 
orientation and the dependence on imported inputs of individual f irms.
5 We note that export-
oriented firms did better than non-exporting firms in the sense that the ratio of their input prices to 
their output prices increased relatively less (16.5% compared to 26.7%)  in Gabon  and 
decreased in Chad (–42%). This was to be expected, given that exporters should have enjoyed a 
fairly substantial increase in the CFAF price of their output. However, prudence is required when 
interpreting the data, due to the small number of exporting firms involved in our sample (only one 
in Chad). 
Furthermore, firms that relied heavily on imported intermediates did quite poorly. In 
Gabon, imported input intensive firms saw the relative price of their inputs increase by 32.2% 
between 1993 and 1996, compared with only 10.7% for firms relying on domestic inputs. In 
Chad, the trend was even more pronounced, as imported input intensive firms saw their relative 
input price rise by 40.1%, while domestic input intensive firms saw a decrease of 
19.5%.Summing up, average changes in relative prices are in the expected direction, as they 




4.  FIRM-LEVEL RESPONSES: OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
 
  Thus far we have established that the devaluation and reforms did indeed change relative 
prices at the firm level as intended. In this section, we look at the impact of the reforms on real 
output and productivity. Among the key objectives of the devaluation and reforms was to shift the 
pattern of production toward tradable goods and boost productivity. Were these goals achieved? 
                                                                   
5  A firm is classified as an exporter if it exports any percentage of the value of its output in 1993. A firm is 
defined as dependant upon foreign inputs when it imports (directly or indirectly) more than 50% of the 
value of its inputs in 1993.   11 
 Moreover ,  
To answer this question, we need  to explore  carefully the link between changes in 
relative prices and output and productivity responses. In order to measure firm-level productivity, 
we begin by defining a cost function as in Tybout, Gauthier, Barba Navaretti and de Melo (1997) 
and Gauthier, Soloaga and Tybout (2002), 
(1)  ) A , P , P , P , Q ( f C K I L =  
where C represents the minimum attainable cost at output level Q, productivity level A 
and a given set of input prices. We make use of a vector of effective (after tax, after tariff) prices 
(i.e. perceived by firms) for intermediate goods, PI labour, PL, and capital, PK . 
Assuming that firms behave optimally, by Shepard’s lemma we can obtain the cost 
minimizing factor demands by taking the first derivatives of the cost function: 
(2)  ( ) ( ) A ln d
A ln















where h  is the elasticity of output with respect to cost, i.e., the inverse of returns to scale, and s j 
denotes the share in total cost of the j
th factor. 
  Equation 2 expresses the rate of growth in total cost as the rate of growth in output, 
weighted by the inverse of returns to scale, plus the share-weighted average rate of growth in 
input prices, plus the elasticity of cost with respect to time, holding output and prices constant. 
This last term is a measure of the rate of productivity growth. 
The standard decomposition of the sources of growth in cost per unit revenue is obtained 
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   12 
where PQ is the price of output. This equation can be rewritten in discrete time using a second-
order Tornqvist approximation of this expression. This is done by replacing differentials with 
difference operators and replacing shares with averages of their beginning-of-period and end-of-
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where D is the difference operator for period t versus t-1 and the overbars denote cross-period 
averages of the associated variable.
7 The interpretation of each term remains the same when 
discrete changes in logarithms are used.
8 
 
                                                                   
6   This equation holds if the (unobserved) cost function is a restricted (homothetic, constant returns) 
translog. Even if these assumptions do not hold, equation 6 provides a second order approximation. 
7  To deal with multiple outputs and inputs, we  aggregate across the individual commodities using 
Tornqvist indices. For example, at a given firm, the rate of growth in the output price index is 
￿ D q = D ) P ( ln PQ ln Q
jt j , where  Q
jt P  is the price in period t of the  j
th product the firm sells, and 






























































5 .  is the average share 
of the j
th product in total revenues in periods t and t-1. Analogous methods lead to Tornqvist indices of 
logarithmic changes in the price of inputs and the price of labor. 
8  The approximation is nearly exact for small rates of growth.   13 
 
Unfortunately, good measures of the returns to scale, ?, are unavailable at the firm level. 
Therefore, in our calculations, we lump together the output growth effect, (1/?  -1) ? ln Q, 
together with the productivity growth effect to yield a general index of efficiency change.
9 It is best 
to think of this scale/productivity term as reflecting all changes in unit costs not accounted for by 
changes in input prices.
10 Only under constant returns to scale, ? = 1, would this term 
correspond to the standard productivity effect.  
  Using this decomposition, we can now explore how changing incentives have led to a 
reallocation of resources and increases in productivity. For this purpose, we estimate 
simultaneously a supply equation for real output growth and an equation of productivity growth. 
The supply equation is specified as follows: 
(5)  i 1 t 1 t 1 t U ) A ln ( ) C DUMEX ( DUMEX C ) Q ( ln e + s + D g + D r + t + D b + a = D - - -  
 
  where  DC measures the changes in relative costs; DUMEX is a dummy variable that 
takes a value 1 if the firms exported in 1993 (more than 10% of their sales for Gabon) and zero 
otherwise;  DlnA is the scale/productivity growth term computed above  as a residual of the 
decomposition of the sources of growth in unit costs; and Ut-1 is utilization of capacity in 1993. 
  Output may increase either because of favorable changes in relative prices (output and 
input prices), or because of an increase in productivity. In general, we expect firms to increase 
                                                                   
9  Also, it should be noted that we take the  total rental cost of capital to be 10% of the replacement cost 
of the capital stocks or the resale value of the capital stocks, depending on which is reported. (Firms 
were given a choice in the interviews.) Past values of capital stock are constructed using investment 
series. Obviously these are crude approximations of the conceptually appropriate measures, but since 
they only affect the  shares  of intermediates in total costs, they should not qualitatively change the 
results on these variables. Their effect on the productivity residual is less innocuous, however, precisely 
because it is a residual. 
10  Our assumption that firms frictionlessly a djust all of their factor stocks is unrealistic. Nonetheless, 
equation 4 should yield a reasonably good approximation to the effects of relative price changes on unit 
production costs. However the productivity effect should be viewed with more caution, since it is inferred 
residually as the difference between a number of imperfectly measured variables.   14 
real output when productivity rises or when their unit costs decline. We consider two alternative 
measures of cost changes. The first one is the variation of total long run unit costs, Dln(C/PQQ). 
It is however suspect of endogeneity, except in the limiting case of constant returns to scale. The 
second measure is much less prone to these problems, as it uses only the exogenous 
component of short run unit cost growth, labor and intermediate inputs, 
SIDln(PI / PQ ) + SL Dln(PL / PQ ).  Regarding U t-1 , we expect that firms already operating at 
relatively higher capacity levels in 1993 faced tighter constraints when trying to increase output. 
  We also allow for the possibility that export oriented firms may respond differently to the 
new economic environment. We do this in two different ways. First, we control for the export 
status of the firm in the previous year by including an export dummy variable Second, we assess 
whether  exporting firms respond more flexibly to changes in relative prices, by interacting the 
export dummy and the cost variables. 
  A key variable on our analysis is productivity. Recall however that our productivity 
measure also embodies scale effects. It is bound therefore to be endogenous. To control for 
such effect, we also estimate a simple productivity equation: 
(6)  ( ) [ ] i 1 t Q ln F A ln e + D s + b + a = D -  
 
  where as a dependent variable (DlnA), we use again the measure of scale/productivity 
growth computed above. The first two explanatory variables are lagged and represent 
characteristics of individual firms. F is a vector of characteristics of the firm at the beginning of 
the period considered that includes the export dummy, the share of imported inputs, the share of 
foreign capital, and the employment share of expatriates. The inclusion of real output growth, 
Dln(Q), is meant to capture the scale component of our productivity measure. Finally, e is an 
error term with standard properties.   15 
  The link between productivity and output is in general undetermined. First, it is a function 
of technology. With increasing returns to scale, higher output may result in higher productivity. 
Second, this link hinges on the reaction of firms to changing incentives. For instance, firms 
facing negative price shocks could respond by reducing output and also cutting x-inefficiencies 
and improving productivity. In the case where devaluation brings a positive price shock and 
higher output, it may nonetheless boost export orientation and expose firms to a more 
competitive environment. The inclusion of output growth in our equation is meant to capture 
some of these scale effects. 
  We estimate the output and productivity growth equations as a system of simultaneous 
equations to control for the endogeneity of these two variables. Table 3 contains the results of 
the two-stage least square estimation of the output equation, where we control for the possible 
endogeneity of productivity growth. Table 4 reports the estimates of the productivity growth 
equation.   16 
 
TABLE 3 
Real Output Growth 
Econometric Results 
 
Dependent variable: real 
output growth 1993-1996 
Dln(Q)?   GABON  CHAD 
Change in total unit costs 
(Dln(C/PQQ) 


















–  – 
Dummy Export 1993 
 
–  0.47 
(0.001) 
–  0.602 
(0.07) 
–  1.644 
(0.00) 
–  1.72 
(0.000) 
Dummy Export 1993 * 
Change Total Unit Cost 
–  –  –1.045 
(0.707) 
–  –  –  –5.932 
(0.000) 
– 
Dummy Export 1993 * 
Change Variable Costs  
–1.529 
(0.015) 
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Number of observations  44  44  44  44  34  34  34  34 
2SLS Regression with robust Standard Errors 





Dependent variable: productivity 
growth (DlnA)  GABON  CHAD 




















Number of observations  44   34 
R
2  0.20  0.29 
2SLS Regression with robust Standard Errors   17 
P values in parenthesis 
 
 
  The estimates of the supply equation are as expected for both countries. From the first 
two columns of the Gabon estimates in Table 3, and from the first two columns of the Chad 
estimates, we can see that output grows in response to a reduction in unit variable costs. The 
other four regressions in Table 3 use total unit costs, which turn out not to be statistically 
significant. This is not particularly surprising, as this measure of costs is a function of output and 
is likely therefore to be endogenous. More crucially, total unit costs are meant to measure the 
long-run cost function, which may be an inappropriate determinant of short-run supply behavior. 
Finally, there may be problems with the measurement of capital costs. 
  Export orientation is also a significant  determinant of output growth. From the first 
columns of the two countries’ regressions in Table 3, we see that exporters are more responsive 
to price shocks than non-exporters (the export dummy multiplied by the variation in costs is 
negative). The positive coefficient of the export dummy in the second set of regressions 
indicates that output growth was faster for exporting firms, even after controlling for price effects. 
Collinearity problems did not permit to include both variables (DUMEX and DUMEXDC) in the 
equation. We also see that productivity growth contributes to output growth. Finally, capacity 
utilization in 1993 bears the expected negative sign, but the coefficient is not statistically different 
from zero. 
  Turning to the productivity equation, real output growth plays a statistically significant role 
in both countries (Table 4). This implies that there are important scale effects which were not 
accounted for when we computed total factor productivity under the assumption of constant 
returns to scale. Also, we see that the skill proxies are significant for Gabon only. Moreover, in 
the case of Gabon, firms with a large share of expatriates on the payroll and a significant foreign 
ownership show a greater productivity increase.   18 
  Finally, productivity  improves less in export oriented firms in Chad. This finding is 
explained by the performance of one exporter (the only Chad exporter in our sample in 1993), 
which was rather poor in terms of productivity growth and quite extraordinary in terms of export 
growth. Even in Gabon, however, the export dummy is not statistically significant. Broadly 
speaking, we can infer that profit opportunities have induced export-oriented firms to increase 
output  but with no visible productivity impact.  
  In conclusion, devaluation appears to have favored exporting firms as far as output 
growth is concerned. Moreover, output growth has triggered productivity growth as firms were 
able to exploit economies of scale. However, output growth rather than export orientation was the 
main determinant of productivity growth. 
 
5.  FIRM LEVEL RESPONSE: EXPORTS 
  We now take a closer look at the pattern of export expansion. We have seen in the 
previous section that output grows more in exporting firms. Focusing on Gabon only – the 
presence of just one exporting firm in Chad makes the analysis much less meaningful – we find 
that real output growth was significantly larger for exporting firms (9.3 %) than for the whole 
sample (4.2 %). How far has this pattern led to an increasing export orientation of the economy? 
Real export growth at 15.5% was substantially larger than real output growth for exporting firms, 
supporting the notion that firms responded to the new constellation of relative prices by shifting 
their output toward foreign markets. Indeed, the weighted average export share for Gabon’s 
exporting firms went from 31.2% to 41.6%
11. 
Of special interest is to examine to which extent the export growth can be attributed to 
incumbent firms, the net entry of new firms into the export markets, and the size differences 
between entering and exiting firms (the turnover effect). Decomposing the sources of export   19 
growth in this way can cast considerable light on the pattern and the determinants of the export 
performance. For instance, widespread entry could be taken as a signal that firms consider 
future profits from foreign sales to be large and, at any rate, to outweigh the start-up costs 
associated with becoming an exporter. It would therefore shed light on the size and credibility of 
export incentives. 
  However, if sunk costs are very large, they may deter entry into foreign markets.
12 Firms 
that have already adapted their products to foreign markets, established packaging systems and 
distribution networks and learned to deal with port authorities and custom officials will be more 
inclined to export than those who have not, all other things being equal. Under such 
circumstances, incumbent firms will play a paramount role in the expansion of exports.
13 Entry 
costs can be expected to be particularly high in Chad and Gabon, especially for the non-African 
markets. Exporters are specialized in the processing of natural resources or crops for export 
(cotton, wood). Most other firms produce import substitution goods, not viable for the export 
market. Switching markets therefore also implies switching products, thus raising entry costs. 
  To cast light on this issue, we decompose nominal export growth following Sullivan, 
Roberts and Tybout, 1995, and Tybout, Gauthier, Barba Navaretti and de Melo, 1997 (see the 
appendix for details). We perform this exercise for Gabon only, given the limited number of 
exporting firms for Chad. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
11  It declines for Chad as a new firm starts exporting in 1996 (only one firm was exporting 100% of its 
output in 1993) with a smaller share than the incumbent one. 
12  Formal models of export behavior in the presence of start-up costs can be found in Baldwin, 1988, 
Baldwin and Krugman, 1989,  Dixit, 1989, Melitz, 2002). 
13  However, incumbent firms may be reluctant to increase their foreign sales. Studying export booms in 
Morocco, Mexico and Colombia, Sullivan, Roberts and Tybout (1995) found that net entry accounted for 
more than half the total growth in exports over a five year period. Firms already exporting were either at 
capacity and unable to export more, or reluctant to redirect output from the domestic market because 
they faced limited demand for their particular products abroad and/or did not wish to become over-reliant 
on risky foreign currency revenue sources.   20 
  The results are reported in Table 5. The incumbent effect, the net entry effect and the 
turnover effect correspond to the three right-hand side terms on the second line of equation (A1) 
in the appendix, and they sum to nominal export growth. 
 
TABLE 5 












1993-96  115,18%  115,43%  –0,237%  –0,0153% 
 
 
  Virtually all export growth is attributable to the incumbents, i.e. to the growth in exports of 
firms which were already exporters in 1993. The net entry effect is negative, because exiting 
firms exported more than entering firms. H owever, their average size was only 2.37% of the 
average size of incumbent firms, and hence the contribution of the net entry effect is practically 
nil. Similarly, the turnover effect accounts for less than 1% of nominal export growth even though 
the turnover rate is 25%, as the size difference between entering and exiting firms is negligible. 
Thus, turnover in the export market is only attributable to small firms, all of similar size. 
  The export decomposition analysis confirms the previous findings of a s tudy on 
Cameroon, using the same methodology (Tybout, Gauthier, Barba Navaretti and de Melo, 1997). 
In Cameroon, as in Chad and Gabon, all nominal export growth was due to incumbents in the 
export market, and the CFA devaluation failed to generate entry into foreign markets by new 
exporters. 
 
   21 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Overall, the main results of the study can be summarised as follows. First, the reforms 
were successful in changing the incentive structure facing producers. Changes in the real prices 
of intermediate inputs and of labour have favoured export-oriented firms and penalized firms that 
cater mainly to the domestic markets and rely heavily on imported inputs. 
Second, firms’ response to changing incentives has been non-negligible. Our findings 
show that output shifted toward the exportable sector. Moreover, we also find evidence of 
substantial productivity gains during the period. 
Third, and on a less optimistic note, the reform process was unable to generate a 
virtuous and self-sustained circle. Regarding exporting firms, we could not find any indications of 
a positive link between export orientation and productivity growth. It is not the case therefore that 
by increasing exports and being subject to stronger competitive pressures, firms became more 
efficient and were thus able to further increase their exports. Our results show that productivity 
growth is mainly a function of output growth rather than export orientation. Productivity growth 
increased more among exporters simply because they were subject to a positive price shock 
and were thus able to grow more rapidly.  
Turning to non-exporting firms, devaluation did not come as a blessing. Input costs 
increased markedly, particularly for firms that rely mostly on imported inputs. Output growth was 
often negative and led the size of many of these firms to contract in absolute terms. Given that 
smaller firms may find more difficult to sustain the fixed costs necessary to penetrate into foreign 
markets, it follows that size will be generally associated with greater export orientation and larger 
firms will be more prone to cater to foreign markets. To the extent therefore that devaluation and 
the reform process were associated with a negative price shock and output contraction for non-
exporting firms, this may make it harder for these firms face to shift toward export markets.   22 
Moreover, given that the output contraction is typically associated with a fall in total productivity, 
this would further compound the task of penetrating foreign markets. 
There are grounds to suspect therefore that the adjustment process could aggravate the 
dualism between large exporters and relatively small firms that cater mainly to the domestic 
markets and are unable (or unwilling) to shift toward foreign markets. The fact that even at the 
firm level it was difficult to discern a significant shift toward foreign markets supports such 
concern.  For Gabon, all export growth was associated with incumbent firms, with a previous 
export tradition. The CFA devaluation failed to generate much entry into foreign markets by new 
exporters, at least in the short time span analyzed in this study. Public policies should be 
designed to identify and correct those factors that prevent the growth of small firms toward a 
more adequate size and that discourage them from turning toward the export markets. 
Institutional rigidities in the credit and the labor market as well as deficiencies in infrastructures 
and regulatory constraints are all potential culprits in this respect and may become the 
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APPENDIX 
Decomposing nominal export growth 
 
We examine the extent to which the increase in nominal exports between 1993 and 1996 
can be attributed to an increase in exports by incumbents, the net entry of new firms into the 























































































































































































  Here 
f
1 it S -  denotes the share of total exports attributable to the i
th plant in year t -1, n
f 
refers to the number of plants that are exporting,  f
t Q  is output sold in foreign markets during year 
t, and overbars denote temporal averages. In general, i subscripts refer to firms, m subscripts to 
incumbent firms, b subscripts refer to plants in their first year of exporting, and d subscripts refer 
to firms that exported at time t -1, but ceased doing so at time t. Aggregates without these 
subscripts refer to the entire set of exporting plants. 
 
  We are concerned mainly with the second line of equation (A1). The first term measures 
the contribution of incumbent exporters to sample-wide export growth. It is a weighted average of 
the growth in exports among producers who continue to sell abroad (i ˛ m), the weights being 
their share in total period t-1 exports. The second term measures the effect of net changes in the 
number of exporters o n growth, i.e. the difference between the number of firms that begin 
exporting between periods t-1 and t (i ˛ b), and the number of firms that cease exporting during 
the same period (i ˛ d). The third term describes the effect on export growth of replacing firms 
ceasing to export with firms beginning to export. If both groups export the same amount per firm, 
the turnover effect is nil. On the other hand, if large exporters drop out of foreign markets and are 
replaced by small exporters, turnover may have a contraction effect. 
 